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VINCENT KANG FU riage pattern, in which group boundaries have no effect on intermarriage pairings. That is, the characteristics of intermarried couples (apart from their group membership) could be similar to those of endogamous couples. This outcome is most likely under circumstances where group boundaries in fact are weak. A second possibility is that the characteristics of intermarried couples suggest status exchange (Davis 1941; Merton 1941) ; this would indicate a hierarchical ordering of groups. In this pattern, members of higher-status groups are able to marry more desirable spouses because of their status advantage. Members of less desirable groups marry less attractive spouses because they themselves are less desirable. A third possibility is that intermarriages follow a pattern of in-group preference, in which individuals prefer to marry within their own group and regard members of all other groups as less desirable. In this scenario, the more attractive members of a particular group will be more likely to realize their preferences by marrying within their group.
Another shortcoming of examining only intermarriage frequencies is revealed by these three ways in which group boundaries can affect intermarriage pairings. The standard approach cannot determine whether people marry within their own group because they prefer high-status spouses or because they prefer members of their own group (Kalmijn 1998:397) . Members of high-status groups will tend to be endogamous whether they prefer to marry high-status spouses or whether they prefer to marry members of their own group because their preferences are the same under both scenarios. Members of low-status groups will have only each other left to marry, and hence also will be endogamous. By examining intermarriage pairings, researchers can adjudicate between the status exchange and the in-group preference hypotheses; this is not possible when only simple intermarriage tendencies are examined.
Evidence from racial intermarriages examined here suggests that some intermarriages indeed are formed under conditions of strong group boundaries. Mexican Americans' marriages with whites and blacks' marriages with whites appear to follow a pattern of status exchange, suggesting that blacks and Mexican Americans are less desirable marriage partners than whites. Japanese Americans' marriages with whites, however, follow the same patterns as endogamous marriages; this finding suggests weak boundaries between these two groups. Focusing exclusively on intermarriage prevalence does not provide a full account of group boundaries. These results demonstrate that intermarriage patterns for blacks and Mexican Americans are governed by a racial hierarchy, not by in-group preference.
Most studies of racial intermarriage rely on the prevalence of intermarriage to measure the strength of group boundaries, without scrutinizing the nature of intermarriage pairings. Examination of intermarried couples' characteristics reveals (1) that intermarriages and endogamous marriages follow different patterns, and (2) that intermarriage pairings for some groups reflect a generalized racial status hierarchy. According to evidence from the 1990 U.S. Census PUMS, patterns in blacks' and Mexican Americans' marriages with whites suggest that a generalized racial status hierarchy disadvantages members of these minority groups. For marriages between Japanese Americans and whites, however, crossing the group boundary does not affect couples ' characteristics. ccording to current perspectives on intermarriage, a high incidence of marriage between members of two groups indicates a weak boundary between the two groups. Alba and Nee's (1996:31) review of assimilation research makes this claim for racial 1 intermarriage, and Kalmijn (1998:396) makes the same claim for intermarriage in general. Yet an exclusive focus on incidence overlooks other important aspects of intermarriage. The characteristics of people who intermarry, apart from their group membership, are one such aspect. What are the characteristics of intermarried couples? Might the pairings of characteristics in intermarriages differ from those in endogamous marriages? If such differences exist, they may suggest (for example) that racial intermarriages are formed under conditions of group inequality. If intermarriages are formed even when group boundaries are strong, then intermarriage prevalence may be a less accurate indicator of weak group boundaries than is usually believed. Examining only the incidence of intermarriage without considering the characteristics of intermarried couples does not provide a complete account of the nature of group boundaries.
In what ways could group boundaries affect the characteristics of intermarried couples? Intermarriages could follow the standard assumption of an endogamous intermar- 1. For the purposes of this paper, I use the term racial intermarriage to refer to marriages between members of different racial and ethnic groups.
Past research on U.S. racial intermarriage patterns focused on the status exchange hypothesis. Most researchers claimed to find support for the status exchange perspective (Hwang, Saenz, and Aguirre 1995 for Asian Americans; Kalmijn 1993:137-39; Qian 1997; Schoen 1995 for blacks; Schoen, Wooldredge, and Thomas 1989 for Latinos) . Recent studies, however, have not adequately tested this hypothesis because they do not rely on sensitive measures of marriage patterns. In this study I outline an improved test of the status exchange hypothesis and expand research in this area by also considering the in-group preference hypothesis. Also missing from previous research is the explicit connection that I draw between the pattern of racial intermarriage pairings and the nature of group boundaries.
MARRIAGE MARKET
Current individual-level theories of marital selection view marriage as a partnership that produces commodities such as children, status, insurance, economic support, and social support (Becker 1991:24; Kalmijn 1998; Oppenheimer 1997) . This framework relies on a market metaphor for the marital selection process: people "shop" in the marriage market for the best spouse they can attract with the resources they have to offer, where the best spouse is the one with whom they can produce the most desired commodities (Edwards 1969:521-23; Goode 1964:32-37; Kalmijn 1991 Kalmijn :27-39, 1993 . The outcome is that people with high levels of resources will marry spouses who also possess high levels of resources.
This "marriage market" framework helps to explain why a bride and a groom often match on a variety of characteristics (Goode 1964:33-37; Kalmijn 1991:18-24; Mare 1991) . Because desirable people can attract and marry other desirable people, couples often match with respect to many characteristics. Matching may be the dominant pattern, but resources may be exchanged where matching is not perfect. For example, a man with a bachelor's degree might marry a woman with little schooling because of her unusual wealth. According to the marriage market framework, her wealth would compensate for her lack of schooling. The individuals' total resources are equivalent, but the pieces composing the total for each individual may differ.
Most studies of patterns in intermarriages have focused on an exchange of racial status for socioeconomic status. Davis (1941) and Merton (1941) originated this line of research when they argued that members of lower-status groups would be more likely to marry members of higherstatus groups if they could offer higher socioeconomic status to compensate for their lower racial status. Schooling has been the socioeconomic status indicator of choice in research on this topic. Education is a key resource in the marriage market because it is an important indicator of one's lifetime income and cultural orientation (Kalmijn 1991:35-39; Mare 1991) . It can provide both social status and economic wellbeing for the couple.
The marriage market framework can reveal how group boundaries affect intermarriage pairings. The first point to consider is that individuals with high total levels of resources can attract spouses with similar levels of resources. Second, couples do not match on all resources. Because any number of resources can be important on the marriage market, people rich with resources in one area may, on average, marry spouses with advantages in a variety of areas. Similarly, people who lack resources in one area may, on average, marry spouses who are lacking in other areas. Women belonging to less desirable racial groups, for example, may tend to marry men who are less healthy and less educated.
If we apply these two principles to racial intermarriage, we can determine how group boundaries affect intermarriage pairings. More desirable individuals should be able to marry more desirable spouses. Below I outline three scenarios describing how racial boundaries can affect intermarried couples' characteristics.
The first scenario is the endogamous intermarriage perspective, which holds that intermarriages follow the same patterns as endogamous marriages. This happens when crossing group boundaries has no effect on intermarriage patterns. This perspective can be found in Weber's discussion of status groups (Weber 1946:180-95; also see McAll 1990; Parkin 1979) . According to Weber, status group membership is accompanied by restrictions on social interaction. These restrictions "may confine normal marriages to within the status circle" (1946:188) . This reasoning leads to the familiar assertion that high rates of intermarriage indicate weak group boundaries. If crossing group boundaries is not unusual, then people belonging to different racial groups should be able to marry equally desirable spouses. Although Weber's discussion makes no prediction about intermarriage patterns when group boundaries are strong, this perspective is the basis for arguments that intermarriage "shows that members of different groups accept each other as social equals" (Kalmijn 1998:396) . The notion of equality between husbands and wives, found in the stratification literature, also may contribute to this perspective (Sorensen and McLanahan 1987:660 ; also see Curtis 1986:179; Szelenyi 1994) .
The second scenario assumes that racial intermarriage patterns reflect a generalized racial status hierarchy. This derives from the status exchange hypothesis originated by Davis (1941) and Merton (1941) . In their original formulation, they argued that minorities compensated their spouses with other resources such as schooling when they intermarried. Merton and Davis maintained, for example, that marriages between highly educated black men and less-educated white women would be a common pattern. In such cases, the black man's high level of schooling would compensate for his lower racial status. The key proposition of this hypothesis is that members of a society generally agree on which racial groups have high status and which groups have low status. When this proposition is combined with the marriage market framework, the implication is that members of higher-status racial groups should be able to marry more desirable spouses than members of lower-status racial groups with comparable characteristics would be able to marry. This scenario suggests that whites would marry more highly edu-fer to marry within their own group. If more attractive individuals are more likely to realize their marriage preferences, then more highly educated people should be more likely to marry within their group. For whites, the pattern expected under this perspective is the same as that under status exchange. In both perspectives it is expected that better-educated whites marry within their own group. For members of minority groups, however, the in-group preference hypothesis is the opposite of the status exchange hypothesis: more highly educated members of minority groups are expected to marry within their group.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Previous researchers tested the status exchange hypothesis against the endogamous intermarriage perspective. Figure 1 illustrates the different approaches to the status exchange hypothesis. Focusing on marriages between blacks and whites, it is a 2 × 2 × 4 × 4 cross-classification of husband's race (white, black) by wife's race (white, black) by husband's schooling by wife's schooling. For the present discussion, the specific schooling categories used are irrelevant. Each 4 × 4 panel represents the education combinations for one of the four possible combinations of husband's race and wife's race. Within each panel, wife's schooling is the column variable, and increases from left to right; husband's schooling is the row variable, and increases from top to bottom.
To illustrate the standard approach to the status exchange hypothesis, let us focus on marriages between black men and white women (panel 3 in Figure 1 ). Variants of the standard approach have been used for decades to test the status exchange hypothesis (Bernard 1966; Heer 1974; Hwang et al. 1995; Monahan 1976; Schoen 1995; ), but here I focus on the strongest of the most recent studies (Kalmijn 1993; Qian 1997) . This approach, called the hypergamy ratio approach (in which hypergamy refers to women marrying up in schooling), examines first the ratio of the number of women marrying up in schooling (the darkly shaded cells below the main diagonal) to the number of women marrying down in schooling (the lightly shaded cells above the main diagonal).
In these studies this ratio is calculated first from the marriages that actually have taken place in the population and then from the marriages that would have taken place under the endogamous intermarriage hypothesis of weak group boundaries. These two ratios are then compared to determine, for example, whether white women married to black husbands actually marry up more often than expected under the endogamous intermarriage hypothesis. If this is found to be the case, one can claim that the data are consistent with the status exchange hypothesis. The reasoning is that the black husbands' additional schooling compensates their white wives for the husbands' lower racial status.
Under the endogamous intermarriage hypothesis, for example, white women might be expected to marry bettereducated black men half as often as they marry less welleducated black men simply because of population composi-cated spouses than would members of minority groups. Equivalently, spouses of whites would be more highly educated than spouses of nonwhites.
This notion of status exchange originated with Davis's (1941) discussion of marriages between members of different castes in India. The comparability of U.S. race relations with India's caste system has been debated sharply (Berreman 1972; Beteille 1975; Cox 1942 Cox , 1945 . One common conceptual distinction between ethnic groupings and caste systems, however, is that the various groups in a caste system are integrated in a hierarchical order, whereas ethnic groups are not arranged hierarchically (Berreman 1972:32; Beteille 1975:224; Weber 1946:188-89 ). If U.S. racial intermarriage pairings fit the status exchange pattern, this would suggest that U.S. race relations and caste systems share the property that groups are integrated hierarchically. Such a situation would be consistent with findings and arguments emphasizing the perniciousness of U.S. racial boundaries (e.g., Bell 1992; Bobo 1997; Hacker 1992; Massey and Denton 1993) .
Third, an alternative to the status exchange pattern is that groups in the United States are arranged horizontally. This scenario suggests that racial intermarriage patterns reflect a preference for spouses belonging to one's own group. Under this scenario, people marry outside their own group only if they cannot find a desirable spouse who belongs to their group. This in-group preference perspective follows from Gordon's (1964) discussion of assimilation, where he asserts that people prefer "the comfort of [their group's] communal institutions" (p. 111). In this perspective, racial identity is viewed as a cultural resource (Kalmijn 1998:399-400 ) that individuals seek to match with their spouse. Cultural similarity enables a couple to forge a common lifestyle and enhances mutual support. In this scenario, individuals who have more resources to offer on the marriage market will be more likely to realize their preferences by marrying members of their own group. If this is the case, then individuals with more schooling should be more likely to marry within their own group. The idea that similarity is attractive in social interaction is also present in the literature on racial residential segregation (Clark 1992 ) and on friendship (e.g., Hallinan and Williams 1989) . This third perspective is also found in Gordon's (1964:132-59 ) discussion of cultural pluralism, in which group boundaries are strong but members of different groups regard each other with tolerance.
What marriage patterns do these three different perspectives expect? The endogamous intermarriage perspective anticipates that racial intermarriages follow exactly the same patterns as endogamous marriages, except (of course) that they are crossing a racial boundary. Members of different groups should be able to marry similarly educated spouses. The status exchange perspective assumes a strong, generalized racial status order. Because more attractive people marry each other, this suggests that individuals of higher racial status will marry better-educated spouses, and that better-educated individuals will marry spouses of higher racial status. Accordingly, whites should marry better-educated spouses. The in-group preference perspective assumes that people pre-groups' members will affect the hypergamy ratio, but there is no reason to focus on this ratio when more direct measures are available.
The main shortcoming of the hypergamy ratio approach is its reliance on crude measures of marriage patterns, which do not account for how far women marry up or down. In the sample of actual marriages between white women and black husbands, white women who marry up may marry up by only one schooling category. The endogamous intermarriage hypothesis, however, might expect that white women marry up by several categories. Yet if the odds of marrying up rather than down were higher in the actual data than under the endogamous intermarriage scenario, the interpretation would be that status exchange is occurring. This would be the interpretation even though white women in the sample seem to be marrying up less far than expected under the endogamous intermarriage hypothesis. Conversely, white women marrying down in actual marriages might marry down more categories than expected under the endogamous intermarriage hypothesis. Nevertheless, the odds of women marrying up rather than down might lead to a conclusion in support of tion. In the intermarriages that have taken place, however, white women actually may marry better-educated black men twice as often as less well-educated black men. If this is the case, then white women are marrying up more often than expected under the endogamous intermarriage hypothesis; this finding is regarded as consistent with the status exchange hypothesis. This hypergamy ratio is also calculated for marriages between white men and black women in panel 2, and corresponding comparisons are made.
The focus of the hypergamy ratio approach-on whether women are more likely to marry up or to marry down-is misplaced because the status exchange hypothesis is not fundamentally concerned with whether women are more likely to marry up or down. Rather, it is concerned with whether members of different groups are equally desirable on the marriage market. In my approach of examining the schooling of different group members' spouses, outlined above, I test the status exchange hypothesis more directly. Observing how often women marry up or down is a roundabout approach to making the key comparison required by the status exchange hypothesis. Certainly the relative desirability of different 
FIGURE 1. APPROACHES TO THE STATUS EXCHANGE HYPOTHESIS
Note: Dark shading denotes women who marry up in schooling. Light shading denotes women who marry down. status exchange, even though white women actually marry down by a shorter than expected distance. 2 A second group of studies (Murstein 1976 (Murstein , 1986 Shinagawa and Pang 1990 ) also tests the status exchange hypothesis, but the methods used are unsound as well. Panels 2 and 4 in Figure 1 illustrate one comparison deriving from this approach. These two panels respectively describe black women's marriages with white men and with black men. In these studies WEDUC2, the schooling of black women married to white men, is compared with WEDUC4, the schooling of black women married to black men. The status exchange hypothesis predicts that WEDUC2 > WEDUC4: black women married to white men have more schooling than black women married to black men. If white husbands indeed are more desirable marriage partners than black husbands, black women with additional resources (schooling, in this case) will be more likely to marry white men.
The hypotheses tested by these studies are well founded, but the methods used to test the hypotheses are flawed because these studies do not control for overall group differences in schooling and for patterns of educational assortative mating. A simple comparison of WEDUC2 with WEDUC4 does not constitute a rigorous test of the status exchange hypothesis because it is also necessary control for the schooling of these black women's white and black husbands. If the white husbands have more schooling than the black husbands, for example, it would be expected that black women married to white men have more schooling than black women married to black men. The black women represented in panel 2 may have more schooling than the black women in panel 4 merely because their husbands have more schooling, not because of status exchange.
DATA AND METHODS
The data for this study come from the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample of the 1990 U.S. Census (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). Men and women from each household who indicated that they were married were matched with each other on the basis of state, household serial number, and (if necessary) subfamily number. 3 To eliminate the possible effects of nativity on intermarriage, I included in the analysis only native-born men and women married to native-born spouses. Foreign-born individuals presumably have not been exposed to the same marriage market as native-born individuals. To reduce marriage survival bias in the sample while still allowing for a reasonable number of cases, I included in the sample only persons under age 35 married to others under 35. 4 In this study I focus on marriages of whites with blacks, Japanese Americans, and Mexican Americans; 5 I selected the sample from the four largest "racial" groups in U.S. society. Because ethnic distinctions within racial groups matter little for non-Hispanic whites (Alba 1990; Lieberson and Waters 1988) and blacks (Cornell 1990:376-79) , I include all blacks and all whites regardless of ethnicity. Ethnic distinctions among different Asian American and Latino groups do matter, however (Bean and Tienda 1987; Pang 1994) ; thus I analyzed only Japanese Americans and Mexican Americans, the Asian American and Latino groups with the largest nativeborn populations. Because marriages between members of the nonwhite groups are so few, I estimate models only for ingroup marriages and for whites' marriages with blacks, Japanese Americans, and Mexican Americans.
Population composition alone might lead to patterns that could be interpreted as consistent with any of the endogamous intermarriage, status exchange, or in-group preference perspectives. Therefore it is imperative to use methods of analysis that will control for the effects of population composition. To examine the three intermarriage scenarios, I use log-linear models to analyze cross-classifications of husbands' and wives' education and race. 6 I classify schooling into four categories: less than high school diploma, high school diploma or equivalent, some college but less than bachelor's degree, and bachelor's degree or more. Although various models have been used to analyze assortative marriage (Johnson 1980; Qian 1997) , a test of the hypotheses of interest here does not require a particularly elaborate loglinear model. In fact, the test I implement is a test of the conditional independence of race and spouse's schooling. After controlling for (1) the general likelihood of intermarriage, (2) marginal educational differences between minority groups and whites, and (3) the association between 2. If researchers account for how far people marry up or down, then focusing on actual levels of the spouses' schooling would make no theoretical or empirical difference in the results.
In a modification of this standard approach that does not compare husband's schooling with wife's schooling, one would compare the schooling of a person's expected high-racial-status spouse with that of a person's expected low-racial-status spouse. The status exchange framework would predict that the latter would have more schooling than the former.
One might, for example, compare the schooling of a woman's expected black husband with the schooling of that woman's expected white husband. If the expected black husband had more schooling than the expected white husband, this finding would sustain the status exchange hypothesis. The black husband's additional schooling would compensate for his lower racial status in relation to the white husband. If the focus were on white women in Figure 1 , for instance, the status exchange hypothesis would expect HEDUC1 (the schooling of white women's white husbands) to be less than HEDUC3 (the schooling of white women's black husbands).
Tests of this hypothesis are not identified, however, because the comparisons deriving from this approach are confounded with marginal differences in schooling. One component of the endogamous intermarriage hypothesis is that group differences in schooling determine racial intermarriage patterns. With standard log-linear marriage models, the terms representing marginal group differences in schooling are precisely equivalent to the terms on which this approach relies to test the status exchange hypothesis.
3. Because marriage licenses do not record the bride's and groom's racial background in all states, census data are the only large-sample data that are readily available. Marriage license data record education at the time of marriage; therefore they cannot account for people who receive more schooling after marriage. Census data can capture some of the educational changes after marriage.
4. Unfortunately, the data on marriage timing needed to identify recently married couples are not available in the 1990 PUMS.
5. Because I cannot control for generation using census data, some of the differences between the racial groups might be due to differences in generational composition.
6. The log-linear models used here cannot account completely for population composition because they consider only married couples. Thus they do not include unmarried people in the pool of potential spouses.
husband's and wife's schooling, is there still an association between respondent's race and spouse's schooling? If so, what pattern does the association follow?
According to the endogamous intermarriage hypothesis, race plays no part in the marital selection process for intermarried people except to take into account marginal group differences in schooling. Thus, after controlling for the three factors listed above, respondent's race should have no effect on spouse's schooling if the data are consistent with the endogamous intermarriage hypothesis. where the λs denote parameters to be estimated. For the race and schooling marginal effects I use dummy coding: whites and less than a high school diploma are the omitted categories. The λ i HR , λ j WR , and λ ij HRWR effects account for differences in the numbers of marriages between white men and white women, white men and minority women, minority men and white women, and minority men and minority women. The parameters λ k HE , λ l WE , λ ik HRHE , and λ jl WRWE account for the marginal distribution of schooling for minority and white men and women. The λ kl HEWE effects account for the association between husband's and wife's schooling. These parameters constitute the endogamous intermarriage model, where respondent's race has no effect on spouse's schooling and the only differences among types of marriages result from differences in the marginal distributions of schooling. The endogamous intermarriage model imposes the constraint that spouse's schooling does not depend on partner's race.
The λ ijl HRWRWE and λ ijk HRWRHE parameters represent respectively the association between husband's race and wife's schooling and wife's race and husband's schooling. I estimate the association between husband's race and wife's schooling separately for white and minority wives. One set of parameters measures the association between husband's race and wife's schooling for white wives; another set measures the association between husband's race and wife's schooling for minority wives. Similarly, I estimate the association between wife's race and husband's schooling separately for white and minority husbands.
This parameterization allows us to determine whether whites' spouses are stochastically higher (Agresti 1990:9-10, 33, 266) in schooling than minorities' spouses. If one distribution is stochastically higher than another, then the higher distribution is more likely to include observations at the higher end of the ordinal scale. If the association parameters suggest that for each pair of adjacent schooling categories, the odds that whites have spouses in the higher category is greater than the odds that members of minority groups do, then we conclude that whites' spouses have more schooling than minority members' spouses, in support of the status exchange hypothesis. The opposite finding-that less highly educated members of minority groups marry whites-would support the in-group preference hypothesis. Table 1 shows the coding for the λ ijl HRWRWE and λ ijk HRWRHE parameters. I use two different models to describe the effect 
Notes:
The models for each minority group include four sets of exchange parameters. These sets of parameters compare (1) the schooling of white wives' minority husbands with the schooling of minority wives' minority husbands; (2) the schooling of white wives' white husbands with the schooling of minority wives' white husbands; (3) the schooling of white husbands' minority wives with the schooling of minority husbands' minority wives; and (4) the schooling of white husbands' white wives with the schooling of minority husbands' white wives. a The local odds ratio is the ratio of the odds for adjacent rows that a minority wife's (husband's) spouse has the higher level of schooling to the odds that a white wife's (husband's) spouse has the higher level of schooling. Negative values for the log local odds ratios in the top panel suggest that wives of minority husbands have less schooling than wives of white husbands; negative values for log local odds ratios in the bottom panel suggest that husbands of minority wives have less schooling than husbands of white wives. of respondent's race on spouse's schooling. The first is a column-effects model with unit-spaced scores for the rows (Agresti 1990:287-90; Ishii-Kuntz 1994) . The second is an "R + C" model (Clogg and Shihadeh 1994:44-45) , which generalizes the column-effects model by estimating the row scores as parameters. For both models, the estimated effects can be interpreted in terms of local odds ratios, which are odds ratios for 2 × 2 tables formed by the intersection of two adjacent rows and two adjacent columns. Thus the λ ij1 HRWRWE effects represent the log of the ratio of the odds of having a high school diploma versus having less than a high school diploma for minority husbands' wives to the same odds for white husbands' wives. The λ ij 2 HRWRWE and λ ij 3 HRWRWE parameters represent the effects for higher pairs of adjacent schooling categories; the λ ij1 HRWRHE , λ ij 2 HRWRHE , and λ ij 3 HRWRHE parameters represent the corresponding effects of wife's racial group on husband's schooling. The column-effects model constrains the exchange parameters in each set, and hence the local odds ratios, to be equal. The "R + C" model allows the exchange parameters in each set to vary.
In every case, a negative value for these exchange parameters suggests that minority respondents' spouses have less schooling than whites' spouses. If all the exchange parameters for a particular comparison are negative, we can conclude that the minority members' spouses have less schooling than whites' spouses.
RESULTS
The sample restrictions yielded a total of 488,673 marriages. Table 2 presents a cross-classification of husband's and wife's schooling by husband's and wife's race. The first column of coefficients in Table 3 presents crude odds ratios representing the likelihood of marrying members of one's own group. For blacks, Japanese Americans, and Mexican Americans, the odds of marrying a member of one's own group rather than a white spouse are much larger than the odds that a white individual would marry a member of the minority group rather than a white spouse. The odds that a black man or woman is married to a black spouse rather than a white spouse is 11,222 times the odds that a white man or woman is married to a black spouse rather than a white spouse. For Mexican Americans, the corresponding odds ratio is 270; for Japanese Americans, 873. These odds ratios do not account for group differences in schooling, and should be considered only crude indicators of intermarriage tendencies. They suggest, however, that group boundaries between Mexican Americans and whites are weakest, followed by those between whites and Japanese Americans. Boundaries between blacks and whites are very strong. Table 4 lists the goodness-of-fit chi-square and BIC statistics for the log-linear models analyzing these marriages. 7 Let us begin by discussing the models for marriages between whites and blacks. Model 1a is the endogamous intermarriage model, which assumes that the only determinants of marriage patterns are educational assortative mating, marginal group differences in education, and an overall tendency to intermarry. For blacks, the endogamous intermarriage model clearly does not fit the data as well as the saturated model (P[χ 2 9 > 311.1541] < .0001), although the BIC statistic indicates that it is more plausible than the saturated model.
Log-Linear Models
Model 2a, the column-effects model, adds a set of constrained exchange parameters (described in Table 1 ) to the endogamous intermarriage model. A likelihood-ratio test reports that these constrained exchange parameters improve the fit of the model substantially (P[χ 2 4 > 95.4425] < .0001). The BIC statistic for Model 2a also suggests that this model is substantially more plausible than the endogamous intermarriage model.
Model 3a is the "R + C" model, which relaxes the constraints on the exchange parameters in Model 2a and estimates independent parameters for the three local odds ratios in each comparison. A likelihood-ratio test for Model 3a against Model 2a (P[χ 2 8 > 46.0204] < .0001) suggests that Model 3a fits the data significantly better than Model 2a, but the BIC statistic for Model 3a indicates that it is actually less plausible than Model 2a.
On the basis of the BIC statistic I prefer Model 2a, especially because the sample size is so large. With such a large sample, relatively small improvements in fit may be statistically significant even if they are of little consequence substantively (Raftery 1995) . The constrained exchange parameters of Model 2a are also easier to interpret, and address more directly the status exchange and in-group preference hypotheses.
A similar pattern also holds for Models 1b, 2b, and 3b for marriages between whites and Mexican Americans. Model 1b, the endogamous intermarriage model, does not fit the data well according to a goodness-of-fit chi-square test (P[χ 2 39 > 448.8377] < .0001), but the BIC statistic suggests that the endogamous intermarriage model in fact is more plausible than the saturated model. Model 2b, the columneffects model with constrained exchange parameters, is a significant improvement in fit over the endogamous intermarriage model (P[χ 2 4 > 352.8809] < .0001). The BIC statistic also indicates that Model 2b is more plausible than the endogamous intermarriage model. Model 3b, the "R + C" model with unconstrained exchange parameters, is a significant improvement in fit over Model 2b (P[χ 2 8 > 59.2621] < .0001), but the BIC statistic suggests that in fact it is less plausible than Model 2b. Because of the large sample size, I prefer Model 2b.
For whites' marriages with blacks and Mexican Americans, the preferred models are the column-effects models with constrained exchange parameters. For Japanese Americans' marriages with whites, however, Model 1c, the endogamous intermarriage model, is preferred. A goodness-of-fit chi-square test (P[χ 2 39 > 60.0065] = .0169) suggests that the fit of this model may be marginally acceptable; the BIC sta-7. The full set of coefficients from these models is available on request from the author. Odds of blacks marrying blacks rather than whites vs. odds of whites marrying blacks rather than whites Log odds ratio **8*9.3256********9.8311**** Standard error 0.0469 0.1077 Odds ratio 11,222 18,603
TABLE 2. CROSS-CLASSIFICATION OF HUSBAND'S AND WIFE'S SCHOOLING BY HUSBAND'S AND WIFE'S RACE
Odds of Mexican Americans marrying Mexican Americans rather than whites vs. odds of whites marrying Mexican Americans rather than whites c Log odds ratio ****5.5997********6.3720**** Standard error 0.0299 0.0619 Odds ratio 270 585
Odds of Japanese Americans marrying Japanese Americans rather than whites vs. odds of whites marrying Japanese Americans rather than whites d Log odds ratio ****6.7725********6.5987**** Standard error 0.0933 0.0943 Odds ratio 837 734 a Crude odds ratios do not account for group differences in education or any other characteristic. b Adjusted odds ratios are taken from the preferred models for each group discussed in the results section. c The adjusted log odds ratio for Mexican Americans is significantly different from the adjusted log odds ratio for blacks (P[|z| > 28.040] < .0001). d The adjusted log odds ratio for Japanese Americans is significantly different from the adjusted log odds ratio for blacks (P[|z| > 22.759] < .0001), and from the adjusted log odds ratio for Mexican Americans (P[|z| > 1.984] = .047). ****p < .0001 Notes: HR = husband's race (white, minority); WR = wife's race (white, minority); HE = husband's education (less than a high school diploma, high school diploma, some college, bachelor's degree or more); WE = wife's education (less than a high school diploma, high school diploma, some college, bachelor's degree or more). Exchange parameters are described in the text and in Table 1. tistic suggests that this model indeed is more plausible than the saturated model. Model 2c clearly gives an adequate fit to the data (P[χ 2 35 > 35.9220] = .4251) and shows a significant improvement in fit over Model 1c (P[χ 2 4 > 24.0485] < .0001), but it also has a larger BIC statistic than Model 1c; this finding suggests that it is less likely than the endogamous intermarriage model to be the true model. The large sample size and large BIC statistic for Model 2c suggest that Model 1c would be more appropriate for these data. Model 3c does not fit the data significantly better than Model 2c (P[χ 2 8 > 9.9969] = .2652), nor does it have a smaller BIC statistic than either of the other two models. Thus, on the basis of the BIC statistics, I prefer Model 1c, the endogamous intermarriage model, for marriages between Japanese Americans and whites.
TABLE 4. GOODNESS-OF-FIT CHI-SQUARE AND BIC STATISTICS FOR MARRIAGE MODELS

Status Exchange for Blacks
Let us focus on marriages between blacks and whites. The first column in Table 5 lists the constrained Model 2a exchange parameters. Three of the parameters in the first column are consistent with the status exchange hypothesis; one of these three is also consistent with the in-group preference hypothesis; and the remaining coefficient is consistent with the endogamous intermarriage hypothesis. The first coefficient is consistent with the endogamous intermarriage hypothesis and suggests that white husbands of black wives and white husbands of white wives have equivalent amounts of schooling.
The second coefficient is consistent with the status exchange hypothesis because black husbands of black wives have less schooling than black husbands of white wives, but it contradicts the in-group preference hypothesis because better-educated blacks are marrying whites. The schooling distribution of white wives' black husbands is stochastically higher than that of black wives' black husbands. The odds that a black woman's black husband falls into the higher of two adjacent schooling categories is 25% less than the odds that a white woman's black husband does so.
The third coefficient is consistent with both the status exchange and the in-group preference hypotheses. It suggests that black husbands' white wives have less schooling than white husbands' white wives: the former are 10% less likely than the latter to belong to the higher of two adjacent educational categories. In this case, black husbands' spouses are less desirable than white husbands' spouses. At the same time, less highly educated, less desirable whites are unable to marry within their own group.
The fourth coefficient is consistent with the status exchange hypothesis but contradicts the in-group preference hypothesis. It suggests that black husbands' black wives have less schooling than white husbands' black wives. The former are 11% less likely than the latter to belong the higher of two adjacent educational categories.
Status Exchange for Mexican Americans
The second column of coefficients in Table 5 lists the estimates of the constrained exchange parameters describing marriages between Mexican Americans and whites. Three of the Model 2b constrained exchange parameters are negative and consistent with the status exchange framework; one of these negative coefficients is consistent with the in-group preference framework. The remaining coefficient is not consistent with any of the hypotheses.
The first coefficient reveals that Mexican American women's white husbands are 13% more likely than white women's white husbands to be in the higher of two educational categories. This contradicts all the hypotheses considered here because it predicts that Mexican American women (who presumably have lower racial status than white women) marry more attractive white husbands than do white women.
The other three coefficients are consistent with the status exchange hypothesis because in each case, Mexican Americans marry less-educated spouses. Mexican American women marry Mexican American men with higher levels of schooling 26% less often than do white women. Mexican American men marry white women with higher levels of schooling 7% less often than do white men. Finally, Mexican American men marry Mexican American women with higher levels of schooling 24% less often than do white men.
The coefficient for white wives' schooling is also consistent with the in-group preference hypothesis, suggesting that more highly educated white women are more likely to marry white men. The second and fourth coefficients, however, have signs opposite those expected by the in-group preference hypothesis; these coefficients suggest that lesseducated Mexican Americans marry within their own group.
Endogamous Intermarriage for Japanese Americans
The third column of coefficients in Table 5 presents the coefficients from Model 2c, describing marriages between Japa- nese Americans and whites. Because the endogamous intermarriage model is the preferred model, there seems to be little difference in the schooling of whites' and Japanese Americans' spouses. Only one of the exchange parameters from Model 2c is statistically significant; it actually indicates that Japanese American women are 31% more likely than white women to marry white men with higher levels of schooling.
Intermarriage Prevalence and Intermarriage Pairings
Accounting for group differences in education and in racial status produces adjusted intermarriage odds ratios that are more accurate than the crude odds ratios in Table 3 . The second column of coefficients in Table 3 presents odds ratios from the preferred models discussed above, which adjust for group differences in education and (if any) in racial status. For blacks, the ratio of the odds that a black man or woman is married to a black spouse rather than a white spouse to the odds that a white man or woman is married to a black spouse rather than a white spouse is 18,603. The corresponding odds ratio for Mexican Americans is 585; for Japanese Americans, 734. A z test calculated from a single log-linear model including the preferred models for each of the groups suggests that the difference between the log odds ratios for Japanese Americans and for Mexican Americans is statistically significant (P[|z| > 1.984] = .047). The difference between blacks' and Mexican Americans' log odds ratios is also statistically significant (P[|z| > 28.040] < .0001). The same is true of the difference between the log odds ratios of blacks and Japanese Americans (P[|z| > 22.759] < .0001). These results suggest that Mexican Americans and Japanese Americans have a weaker tendency to marry within their group than do blacks. Japanese Americans tend more strongly to marry within their group than do Mexican Americans.
Because these log-linear model parameters are estimated from national data and thus cannot account for the local nature of marriage markets, they only crudely reflect the strength of the boundaries between these minority groups and whites. Yet when we compare the conclusions drawn from examining intermarriage prevalence for Japanese Americans and Mexican Americans with the conclusions drawn from examining intermarriage pairings for the same two groups, we see a potential pitfall of the standard practice of focusing exclusively on intermarriage prevalence. According to intermarriage odds ratios, the boundary between whites and Japanese Americans is stronger than the boundary between whites and Mexican Americans. According to intermarriage pairings, however, the boundary between whites and Japanese Americans is weaker than that between whites and Mexican Americans. This finding demonstrates that the standard practice of comparing counts of intermarriages to determine the relative strength of group boundaries may be unreliable.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Overall, the evidence presented here is most consistent with the status exchange hypothesis for marriages between whites and blacks and between whites and Mexican Americans. For marriages between Japanese Americans and whites, the endogamous intermarriage hypothesis carries the day. Some of the coefficient estimates also are consistent with the in-group preference hypothesis, but the overall pattern of results more strongly supports the status exchange hypothesis. These findings indicate that in a sphere of social interaction as intimate as marriage, racial stratification still is present for blacks and Mexican Americans: racial boundaries reduce their attractiveness to potential spouses. For Japanese Americans, however, racial boundaries do not matter in marriages with whites.
Marriage across racial boundaries does not indicate complete acceptance between members of the two groups. Although such marriages may help weaken racial boundaries, intermarriage prevalence may not be a reliable indicator of the strength of group boundaries. People who intermarry are assumed to be among those least likely to be affected by group boundaries. The evidence presented here, however, demonstrates that even among those who intermarry, racial boundaries matter and play a significant role in spouse selection. This suggests that the prevalence of racial intermarriages should not be the sole dimension of intermarriage used to investigate group boundaries.
This study also has shown that a racial hierarchy governs the marriage market; this point demonstrates that U.S. race relations possess one characteristic of a caste system. This finding also is consistent with studies of attitudes toward residential segregation, which find a hierarchy of preferences for neighbors belonging to different racial groups Zubrinsky and Bobo 1996) .
The results reported here, based on an improved test of the status exchange hypothesis, are largely consistent with Kalmijn's (1993) and Qian's (1997) findings based on the hypergamy ratio approach. In both studies the investigators concluded that status exchange exists in marriages between blacks and whites. Qian (1997) also found status exchange in marriages between Hispanics and whites. Hwang et al. (1995) concluded that there is evidence of status exchange in marriages between Asian Americans and whites, but Qian (1997) actually found that, for white men, Asian American women seem to be more attractive marriage partners than white women.
One unexpected pattern appears in the coefficients that relate white husband's schooling to wife's race. These coefficients suggest that minority wives' white husbands have more schooling than white wives' white husbands. They are the only coefficients that do not fit the status exchange hypothesis for blacks' and Mexican Americans' intermarriages. The coefficient for Japanese Americans' intermarriages also does not fit the endogamous intermarriage hypothesis. Although I do not have an elaborate explanation for these discrepant findings, they may derive from white men's position at the top of the racial status and gender hierarchies. These coefficients indicate that white men who marry nonwhite women are high in the education hierarchy as well. Perhaps their advantaged position at the top of these hierarchies allows them the freedom to choose spouses with little regard for the spouses' racial and socioeconomic resources. A more definitive explanation awaits further research, however.
One identification problem in testing hypotheses about intermarriage pairings is the exchange of resources other than schooling and racial status. For example, minority women who marry white men may have more prestigious occupations than the white women these men might have married. In this case, minority women are exchanging occupational prestige (rather than schooling) for their spouses' higher racial status; therefore the status exchange perspective would not expect them to have more schooling than the white women their husbands might have married. Alternatively, the white husbands might be unusually deficient in some respect, and the minority wives thus might not need to compensate so much for their lower racial status. Unfortunately the data I use to test hypotheses about intermarriage pairings do not contain measures of many of the other characteristics that are important on the marriage market.
Fortunately, this problem is not disastrous. A number of resources important on the marriage market, such as income and occupational prestige, in fact are strongly related to schooling. Kalmijn (1991:35-39) stressed the importance of education on the marriage market because of search costs and uncertainty about a potential spouse's future characteristics. A focus on education can reduce search costs because a potential spouse's education usually can be known with certainty. Education also can be a rough indicator of a potential spouse's current and future resources. Elaboration of the model used here to include resources besides schooling and race would be a worthy direction for future study, but the more parsimonious framework I use still yields solid evidence about intermarriage pairings. 8 In this study I have demonstrated that the standard practice of examining only the frequency of intermarriage overlooks important information about group boundaries, which can be found by examining the patterns of intermarriage pairings. Examining intermarried couples' characteristics reveals additional information about the nature of such boundaries. Furthermore, an examination of intermarriage pairings reveals whether the marriage market is governed by an in-group preference or a status hierarchy regime. Although this study focuses on racial intermarriage, these ideas can be extended to studies of intermarriage with respect to other characteristics such as religion and social class background.
